The significance of preventing accidents In a construction industry

The signifi fag endce of pr even outting fortuitys In a construction industryToday, most of the vizor managers, contr actuateors and workers, who work in construction industry, argon aw atomic number 18 astir(predicate) the signifi basince of preventing possibility.( In fact they know that ignoring condom and wellness can impose a high penalty on a comp each -large or sm altogether. Also individual shot or stain can mean compensation, time off and lost production and what carry seemed to be a minor risk becomes a major liability)(safety at work/compi direct by Badrie Abdullah/p.iii). Therefore they know the valuable of occupational safety and health counseling (OSH), although most of the managers havent enough knowledge about OSH. It essence that they dont know what the OSH is and how they must use it. In this report I try to investigate different trip of OSH anxiety in addition the need for it.IntroductionIn current years, construction mishap rates have decreased as a resultant of substantial effort by many parties. Increased pressures from OSHA and owners, and increased cost of casualtys raised the contractors aw areness. In twist, contractors increased safety training and enforcement. These efforts have decline the injury and illness rate from 12.2 in 1993 to 7.9 in 2001.The recent court to accident prevention is based on OSHAs violations approach and focuses on prescribing and enforcing defenses that is, physical and procedural barriers that smother the workers exposure to hazards. The violations of the defenses are called unsafe conditions and unsafe behaviors. (Systems stick of Construction stroke Causation /Panagiotis Mitropoulos1 Tariq S. Abdelhamid2 and Gregory A. Howell3.p.12)Only knowing about the benefits of OSH management isnt enough, we must be act and apply it. So at first its important to understand the necessity of OSH management thusly definition of OSH management and finally how we can follow its rules to construct ou r workplace safe.Who are included in the safety value range of a function?Maybe, it s better to ask this question who should be interested in accident causation and safety system?In fact the safety value chain includes students, re awaiters, technicians, system designers, operators, managers, shareholders, accident investigators and safety inspectors. (Fig.1), all these groups scratch to system safety in different time-scale. Educators and researchers play important role in this safety value chain, be get educators by t severallying safety culture can help students to have awareness before they enter to workplace and they impact on accident prevention in long term.Safety levelsShort- term Medium-term Long-termRegulatoryAccident investigators, safety inspectors, and regulators(Penalties)Economic(Incentives)InsurersshareholdersOrganizational/ Managers and company executivesManagerialOperational/ Technicians and system designersMaintenanceTechnical/ Engineers and system designersDesi gnResearch researchers and academicsEducation studentsFig 1.safety levers and shareholders in the safety value chainAccident theories based on yearNO moldsyear1Domino TheoryHeinrich19312Multi casual ModelGordon19413Critical Incident TechniqueFlanagan19544Combination of Factors ModelSchulzinger19565Goals Freedom Alertness TheoryKerr19576 life force Exchange ModelHaddon et al19647Decision ModelSurryIn Viner19691991a8Behavioral MethodsHale HaleAnderson et al197019789 transformation Tree summary IIMeisterHoys Zimolong1971198810Error ModelWigglesworth197211Life Change Unit ModelAlkov197212Hazard Carrier ModelSkibaHoys Zimolong1973198813Task-Demand ModelWaller Klein197314Multi linear Events Sequencing ModelBanner197515Systems Safety compendiumSmil consist Ayoub197616Risk Estimation ModelRowe197717 endangerment response ModelHale Prusse197718Incidental Factor Analysis ModelLeplat197819Accident Sequence ModelRamseyQuoted in Sanders McCormick Ramsey19781987198520Psychological ModelC orlett Gilbank198721Domino/ heftiness ReleaseZabetakis, quoted in Heinrich et al198022Stair Step ModelDouglas, quoted in Heinrich et al198023Motivation Reward Satisfaction ModelPetersen, quoted in Heinrich et al198024Energy ModelBall, quoted in Heinrich et al198025Systems ModelFirenze, quoted in Heinrich et al198026Epidemiological ModelSuchman, quoted in Heinrich et al198027Updated Domino ModelBird Jr, quoted in Heinrich et al198028Updated Domino ModelAdams, quoted in Heinrich et al198029Updated Domino Model IIWeaver, quoted in Heinrich et al198030Task Ability ModelDrury Brill198031OARU ModelKjellen HovdenKjellen Larsson198132Traffic Conflicts TechniqueZimolong198233Signals Passed at Danger Decision Tree ModelTaylor, R. K. and Lucas, D.A in ch.8 of Van Der Schaaf , Lucas Hale199134Ergonomic Behavioral MethodsKjellen198435Human Causation ModelMager Pipe198436Near Accidents IncidentsSwain198537Behavior ModelRasmussen198638Contributing Factors ModelSanders Shaw198739Hazard Car rier ModelHayos Zimolong198840Comet ModelBoylston199041Comprehensive Human Factors ModelDejoy199042View of Workers on Safety Decisions ModelSaari199043Epidemiological ModelKriebel, quoted in Cone et al199044Universal ModelMcClay199045Federation of Accident Insurance Institution(Finland)ModelSeppanen199746Question Tree ModelHale et al.in Van Der Schaaf, Lucas Hale199147 happening Con era Process ModelViner1991b48Onward Mappings Model based on Resident Pathogens MetaphorReason199149Functional Levels ModelHurst et al199250Tripod TreeWheelahan199451Attribution Theory ModelDejoy199452Cindynic HyperspaceKervern199553Fig.2 Accident theories (Enhancing occupational Safety and Health, Geofry Taylor, Kellie Easter, Roy Hegney)2004What is occupational safety and control?The Occupational Safety and Health management is a management which provides the legislative framework to secure the safety, health and welfare among all workforces and to protect others against risks to safety or health in connection with the activities of persons at work.( Job Seeker Handbook/alaysian Labour Law Regulation of Employment)Occupational health and safety is a discipline with a broad scope involving many specialized fields. In its broadest sense, it should aim atthe promotion and importanttenance of the highest degree of physical, mental and social public assistance of workers in all occupationsthe prevention among workers of adverse effects on health slipd by their operative conditionsThe protection of workers in their employment from risks resulting from portions adverse to healthThe placing and maintenance of workers in an occupational environment adapted to physical and mental unavoidablyThe adaptation of work to pityings.In other words, occupational health and safety encompasses thesocial, mental and physical well-being of workers that is the whole person. (Website of InternationalLabor establishment)What is an accident?It is necessary to define what we mean by the word accid ent, because before anyone can begin to put up any sort of a flight, he must know his enemy. So we must do the same.An accident is an chance(prenominal) event, which could result in injury to persons or in damage to plant and equipment or both. Also accidents are consequent of unplanned (unsafe) acts or unplanned (unsafe) conditions performed or created by people. In fact people cause accidents, by what they do or what they neglect to do and the activity of people, in a factory or any other place of work, are controlled by management. (a safe place of work/D.WB James/p.56)From the linguistic point of view, the word accident is the present participle of the Latin verb accident which means to happen, which in turn is derived from ad- + cadere, meaning to fall. The literal meaning of accident is therefore that of a fall or stumble. The derivation from to fall is significant, since falling is not something one dose on purpose. If someone falls while walking or while climbing, it is dec idedly an unexpected and unwanted event. It is, in other words, what we call an accident an unforeseen and unplanned event, which leads to some sort of loss or injury.Other definitions of accident , such as they can be plunge in various dictionaries, concur that an accident is an unforeseen and unplanned event or circumstance that (1) happens unpredictably without discernible human intention or observable cause and (2) leads to loss or injury. use as an adverb, to say that something happens accidently or happens by accident means that it happens by chance. (Barriers and Accident ginmill/Erik Hollnagel p.34/2005)The need for accident dumbfoundsIt is a truism that we cannot think about something without having the words and designs to sop up it, or without having some frame of reference. The advantage of having a common frame of reference is that communication and understanding become more(prenominal)(prenominal) efficient, because a number of things can be taken for granted. T he frame of reference is particularly important in thinking about accidents, because it determines how we view the role of humans. (Barriers and Accident Prevention/Erik Hollnagel p.4445/2005)Accident causation models catch 2.Diagram showing the dominate five cognitions of accident causation (Benner 1975).The genius event cin one caseptSINGLE EVENT beliefWhat the first opinion of accident causation is the Single Event Concept. This idea concentrates that a single event caused accident. It means that this simple model is the widestThe first perception of accident causation is the single event concept. This concept focuses on the premise that accidents are caused by a single event. This simple model exemplifies the quest for the cause of what occurred. The search for a scapegoat and taking care of the scapegoat would solve the problem. This concept is the most widely perceived and least complex. The public and media typically engage this concept when they ask what caused the accid ent?LimitationsThe single events concept is limited in its ability to see the accident as a process or period of events in time. The factors that may contribute to the accident are not identified or pursued due to the fact that the real cause is obvious and visible. Causes that may underline human behavior are rarely determined.ApplicationCurrent applications are primarily apparent in how the public and media view accidents. This viewpoint is fortify by findings such as when an airline accident was caused by pilot error. Police citations are another example of the perception.CHAIN OF EVENTS CONCEPTHistoryThe chain of events concept or domino guess was originally developed by Heinrich (1941). The basic concept implied that accidents resulted from a sequence of events that led to an accident. Like a language of dominos, once the sequence began each event led to the next until an accident occurred. Intervention at any point along the events sequence could halt the accident process and eliminate the unwanted results. An unsafe act starts the chain of events that began with an unsafe condition.LimitationsThis concept is limited by the linear progression characteristic of the model. Interactions among events, contributing causes, and the duration and timing of each event limit the identification of all causal factors.ApplicationsThe current use of this concept is prevalent in the legal field that attempts to speculate the sequence of events that led to the accident.2.the determinat variable concept3.the domino scheme4.the fault tree analytical modeologyFAULT TREE ANALYSISHeinrich (1941) developed the methodology that preceded and formed the basis for Fault Tree Analysis. He illustrated the linear sequence of factors in accident causation by utilize a domino theory. The theory stated that a disturbance that caused any one of the five identified components of the sequence to fail would set off a chain-of-events that led to an accident. The five in the seque nce were 1) ancestry and social environment, 2) conditions and fault of person, 3) unsafe act, 4) unsafe condition and 5) injury. He showed that by intervention at any point along the sequence an accident/injury could be prevented. This theory has been modified and updated (Baker 1953, Marcum 1978, Heinrich et al 1980), and has wide applicability in current automobile accident and law enforcement investigations.Similar linear sequence models such as Critical Path Analysis (CPA), Gantt Charts, and Program Evaluation Research Task (PERT), were initially used in the 1950s and 60s as planning tools (Lockyer 1964). Though many names were given to their process they were very similar in their goals and methods. They provided a graphical display of activities linked to events by arrows in pitch to plan complex projects. The process illustrated a flow (path) from one task sequence to the next and incorporated time frames and interrelationships between tasks. Projects could then be analyse by task, the amount of time needed for each segment and the relationship a task may have with another task. These methods offered an stiff means of project planning, costs synopsis, and time frame considerations by visually outlining the task process (Lockyer 1964). These processes also provided the means to better understand the interrelationships between and among tasks. This logical depiction of process flow related directly to analyzing an accident sequence and the precursor events.In the 1960s Bell Laboratories expanded upon the linear chain of events concept through with(predicate) missile system safety. They arranged events in a flow chart that used a proceed/follow logic pattern. Their concept, Fault Tree Analysis ( jut out 11), is largely credited to Watson (1971). Figure 12 illustrates the fault tree concept as applied to a hypothetical accident where a wildland firefighter was burned. This analysis concept helped provide a sense of management by fair games by ident ifying unwanted events (the top event) and then systematically and sequentially determining the precursor events. The objective is the top event and the identification of the preceding causal factors aid in the management achievement of that objective. Watsons Fault Tree Analysis investigation methodology provided a visible, easily understood and defendable format (1971). The methodology extended the linear chain of events into a branched events chains concept through the use of and/or logic gates. It uses basic Boolean logic in a hierarchical tree format. Other Boolean terms such as not are not used in Fault Tree Analysis. For example, C can only occur when both AandB occur. If two or more events are required for a cause to happen then an and symbol is used. Another possibility is when only one of the factors need be present. For C to occur, then AorB occurred. If only one event of two or more are necessary then an or gate is used. The top event is the unwanted result of the accide nt and causal factors branch out below leading to it. The obliterateward sequence is continued until the root causes are found or the tree cannot be further developed. This technique, according to Benner (1975), contributed a powerful tool for the investigation of accidents both historical and postulated. Accidents could be investigated or reinvestigated in the search for causal factors utilizing this method. It assisted in illuminating areas that may have previously been overlooked by other means. Numerous approaches to determining accident causal factor using branched events chains reflected the discipline of the investigations employing it thus medical doctorsused an epidemiological approach (agent/host/environment), while psychologists focused on human factors.Figure 11. Fault Tree diagram illustrating a typical loser process, symbols used,and the logic sequence leading to an undesired event, a dark room (in Ferry 1988).Figure 12. Fault Tree diagram illustrating the deductive process using an example of a sequence of events in which a firefighter receives burns. angiotensin-converting enzyme key bound of Fault Tree Analysis is the inability to model time sequences that are concurrent and interactive (Hendrick and Benner 1987). Brown (1993) added that only one event could be analyzed at a time and thus primarily applicable to catastrophic events. Benner (1975) cited similar deficiencies, most notably that charting analysis methods focus on a single undesired event and provided no means to indicate the chronological relationships (and the subsequent concurrent interrelationships) of events. Another limitation is the restriction inherent in the method whereby causes must be either successes or failures and degrees of each are not accounted for (Tulsiani and others 1990).5.the get-up-and-go-barriers-targets modelBarriers AnalysisBarriers Analysis is an accident investigation method that is an additional component of the MORT process. The method identifies barriers/controls that are in place to prevent accidents. These barriers may be physical and/or administrative and must be absent, inadequate, or bypassed in order for the accident to occur. A more detailed account of this approach will be undertaken in the methods section as this method is one of the USDA proposed investigative tools (USDA 1998).6.the management oversight and risk treeHistoryTraditional accident investigations focused on the active response to a mishap and the identification of procedures to prevent future occurrences. The degree and intensity of the accident dictated the intensity of the investigation response and subsequent preventative action (Brown 1993). But as technology advanced and systems became more complex, the consequences of accidents became increasingly unacceptable to society and industry, particularly in the nuclear power industry. The nuclear industry and similar high-risk technologies have determined that learning from accidents and even near mi sses was not an option. The consequences of accidents precluded the traditional trial by error approach where as accidents occurred the problem was fixed subsequent to the next mishap (termed the fly-fix-fly approach). A recent approach was undertaken to become proactive as well as reactive in accident analysis techniques to determine possible failure points prior to occurrence. Johnson (1973a) working for the National Safety Council and under a contract from the US Atomic Energy Commission focused on a systems approach to accident analysis. This approach focused on the entire system in which accidents occurred and the interaction of events within that system. Johnson merged two basic views to focus on management responsibility in planning the context in which accidents occur. These views, understanding the energy release process and focusing management of that hazard on the route of its release, led Johnson to develop the concept of less than adequate management decisions. This pr ogressed to the Management Oversight and Risk Tree (MORT) accident analysis tool. He said MORT was an analytical procedure that provides a develop approach for finding the causes and contributing factors of mishaps. It entailed a very broad and detailed checklist that facilitated the search for safety problems. It incorporated 1500 possible causes and 98 generic problems and was the initial methodology to embody management oversight into accident causation. The Department of Energy currently employs this method as one of its most comprehensive analytical techniques (DOE 1992). It is more generally used as a proactive method in safety system evaluations than as an accident investigation method. This is primarily due to the fact that it can be time consuming and intensive and due to the nature of the nuclear industry, identifying possible loopholes in the safety system to eliminate hazards is more cost effective and publicly expedient than after the accident occurs.This concept was h ighly visible, easily reviewed and updated as new relevant facts warrant, and provided structure to help reduce overlooked factors and bias. at heart the MORT system incidents were defined as inadequate barrier/controls or as failures without consequence. Accidents resulted in adverse consequences. The MORT system incorporated the concept of the unwanted transfer of energy that can cause mishaps due to inadequate barriers/controls. These barriers and controls may be physical (protective clothing, concrete walls, etc) or administrative (codes, standards and regulations). The MORT system is based on two main sources of accidental losses 1) specific job oversights and omissions and 2) the management system factors that control the job (Johnson 1973a). A third source he mentioned was assumed risk. Johnson noted that once this source was properly evaluated it could not be considered accidental in nature since we have consciously decided to accept the risk. Integral aspects of the MORT process are Fault Tree Analysis, Barriers Analysis and Event and Causal Factors Charting. Each of these approaches will be subsequently explained.LimitationsLimitations of MORT are that it can be insufficient in finding specific causes as it designed to identify general causal areas (Gertman and Blackman 1994). These authors do recognize its strengths in identifying more specific control and managerial factors. Moreover, this systematic process is positive when system experts are not available.ApplicationIts current use as a proactive safety system analysis tool for the Department of Energy has long standing (Briscoe 1990). It has been used exclusively as both a proactive technique and an accident investigation method for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.7.petersens multiple causation model8.reasons swiss chess model of human error 1990Reasons Swiss Cheese Model of Human ErrorOne particularly appealing approach to the genesis of human error is the one proposed by James Reason (199 0). Generally referred to as the Swiss cheese model of human error, Reason describes four levels of human failure, each influencing the next (Figure 1). Working backwards in time from the accident, the first level depicts thoseUnsafe Actsof Operators that ultimately led to the accident1. More commonly referred to in aviation as air crowd/pilot error, this level is where most accident investigations have focused their efforts and consequently, where most causal factors are uncovered. After all, it is typically the actions or inactions of aircrew that are directly linked to the accident. For instance, failing to properly scan the aircrafts instruments while in instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) or penetrating IMC when authorized only for visual meteorological conditions (VMC) may yield relatively immediate, and potentially grave, consequences. Represented as holes in the cheese, these active failures are typically the last unsafe acts committed by aircrew.1Reasons original wor k composite operators of a nuclear power plant. However, for the purposes of this manuscript, the operators here refer to aircrew, maintainers, supervisors and other humans involved in aviation.However, what makes the Swiss cheese model particularly useful in accident investigation, is that it forces investigators to address latent failures within the causal sequence of events as well. As their name suggests, latent failures, unlike their active counterparts, may lie dormant or undetected for hours, days, weeks, or even longer, until one day they adversely affect the unsuspecting aircrew. Consequently, they may be overlooked by investigators with even the best intentions.Within this concept of latent failures, Reason described three more levels of human failure. The first involves the condition of the aircrew as it affects performance. Referred to asPreconditions for Unsafe Acts, this level involves conditions such as mental fatigue and poor communication and coordination practices , often referred to as crew resource management (CRM). Not surprising, if fatigued aircrew fail to communicate and coordinate their activities with others in the cockpit or individuals external to the aircraft (e.g., air traffic control, maintenance, etc.), poor decisions are made and errors often result.Figure 1. The Swiss cheese model of human error causation (adapted from Reason, 1990).But exactly why did communication and coordination break down in the first place? This is perhaps where Reasons work departed from more traditional approaches to human error. In many instances, the breakdown in good CRM practices can be traced back to instances ofUnsafe Supervision, the third level of human failure. If, for example, two inexperienced (and perhaps even below average pilots) are paired with each other and sent on a flight into known adverse weather at night, is anyone really surprised by a tragic impression? To make matters worse, if this questionable manning practice is coupled wit h the lack of quality CRM training, the potential for miscommunication and ultimately, aircrew errors, is magnified. In a sense then, the crew was set up for failure as crew coordination and ultimately performance would be compromised. This is not to lessen the role played by the aircrew, only that intervention and mitigation strategies might lie higher within the system.Reasons model didnt stop at the supervisory level either the organization itself can impact performance at all levels. For instance, in times of fiscal austerity, funding is often cut, and as a result, training and flight time are curtailed. Consequently, supervisors are often left with no alternate but to task non-proficient aviators with complex tasks. Not surprisingly then, in the absence of good CRM training, communication and coordination failures will begin to appear as will a myriad of other preconditions, all of which will affect performance and elicit aircrew errors. Therefore, it makes sense that, if the accident rate is going to be reduced beyond current levels, investigators and analysts alike must examine the accident sequence in its entirety and expand it beyond the cockpit. Ultimately, causal factors at all levels within the organization must be addressed if any accident investigation and prevention system is going to succeed.In many ways, Reasons Swiss cheese model of accident causation has revolutionized common views of accident causation. Unfortunately, however, it is simply a theory with few details on how to apply it in a real-world setting. In other words, the theory never defines what the holes in the cheese really are, at least within the context of everyday operations. Ultimately, one needs to know what these system failures or holes are, so that they can be identified during accident investigations or better yet, detected and corrected before an accident occurs.The balance of this paper will attempt to describe the holes in the cheese. However, rather than attempt to define the holes using esoteric theories with little or no practical applicability, the original framework (called theTaxonomy of Unsafe Operations) was developed using over 300 Naval aviation accidents obtained from the U.S. Naval Safety Center (Shappell Wiegmann, 1997a). The original taxonomy has since been refined using input and data from other military (U.S. army Safety Center and the U.S. Air Force Safety Center) and civilian organizations (National Transportation Safety Board and the Federal Aviation Administration). The result was the development of the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS).1.2. Accident investigation methodsDuring the last decades, a number of methods for accident investigation have been developed and described in the literature.The selection of methods for the needs of our study was made on the basis that they are described in the literature, they show the evolution of accident investigation over time and they are either widely used or recently developed. Based on these criteria, the following methods were selected1.2.1. Fault tree analysis (FTA)FTA was developed in the early 1960s by the Bell Laboratories (Ferry, 1988). In FTA, an undesired event (an accident) is selected and all the possible things that can contribute to the event are diagrammed as a tree in order to show logical connections and causes leading to a specified accident. FTA is more an analytical tool for establishing relations it does not give the i